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cially where a constitutional limitation is involved. Even though the court
seemingly based its decision on the constitutional limitations, it was primarily
influenced by the broader policy arguments, as evidenced by the court's
emphasis on pragmatism and fairness. Thus, future constructions of the
statute involving preparatory or preliminary activities of the public agency
will likely find this aspect of the executive process beyond the reach of the
sunshine law, regardless of whether a convenient constitutional limitation
can be discerned.
JOSEPH S. GILLIN, JR.

CRIMINAL LAW: VOICEPRINT EVIDENCE IS BEING HEARD
Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972)
Police received two anonymous phone calls that bombs had been hidden
in the police station and in a utilities building. The second call was traced
to a phone booth near which defendant was apprehended. At trial, defendant was convicted of telephoning false bomb threats upon evidence that
included voiceprints., On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
and HELD, voiceprints were properly admitted to corroborate defendant's
identification where sufficient evidence was available to sustain his conviction
2
without the use of voiceprints.
Like most jurisdictions, 3 Florida has long permitted identification of
individuals by voice recognition. 4 Whether directly or indirectly by use of
sound recordings, 6 identification of the human voice has been admissible
1. Tape recordings made of the voice of the caller and the defendant were transformed
into voiceprints, which upon analysis were determined to be the same. 263 So. 2d 613, 614
(4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
2. 263 So. 2d 613 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972) (Mager, J., concurring specially; White, J.,
dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Ogden v. People, 134 Ill. 599, 25 N.E. 755 (1890); State v. Herbert, 63 Kan.
516, 66 P. 235 (1901); Price v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 501, 34 S.W. 622 (1896).
4. Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55, 44 So. 706 (1907).

5. Id.
6. Parnell v. State, 218 So. 2d 535 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). For a tape recording to be
admissible it must be shown to the trial court's satisfaction that: (I) the recording device
was operating properly, (2) it was operated in a proper manner, (3) the recording was
accurate, and (4) the voices of the persons speaking were identified. Id. at 541.
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evidence not merely as a matter of opinion but as a conclusion reached
directly from the sense of hearing.7 However, the reliability and credibility
of such evidence has been a question for the jury.8
Although testimony regarding voice identification poses problems of
reliability, the recent advent of the science of sound spectography promises
a potentially reliable technique of voice identification.9 Proponents claim
that, like fingerprints, no two human voices are identical.- The sound
spectographic technique consists of recording a speech sample as a spectogram
on electrically sensitive paper." These graphic representations, or voiceprints,
are then compared with those sought to be identified. This method of voice
2
identification is purported to be ninety-eight per cent reliable.'
As a scientific innovation voiceprints have presented courts with questions
of admissibility.- To determine the admissibility of scientific evidence many
jurisdictions, 4 including Florida, 5 apply a special quantitative test that
requires "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."'16
This test confronts the courts with several problems: distinguishing scientific
evidence from other expert testimony, deciding what is the particular field
7
to which the evidence belongs, and determining what is general acceptance.'
After resolving these difficulties, the court must also determine the sufficiency
of the qualifications of experts who are to render opinions on the results
of applications of scientific devices or techniques that have been judicially
accepted.' 8
Since the admissibility of scientific evidence is largely a matter of judicial
discretion, 0 it is difficult to ascertain what factors weigh most heavily in a
court's determination of admissibility. Thus, in attempting to ascertain a test
for the admissibility of voiceprints, the principal court found conflicting
standards20 as well as contradictory judicial dispositions of the question.21
7. Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55, 62, 44 So. 706, 709 (1907).
8. Id.
9. See Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253 (1962).
10. Id. at 1255. Known as the theory of "invariant speech," it is hypothesized that any
given individual's speech pattern is sufficiently different from all others that the normal
variance in the pattern does not cause coincidence with another's pattern.
11. Potter, Visible Patterns of Sound, 102 ScINcaE 463, 465 (1945).
12. Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nichol & Nash, Voice Identification Through Acoustic
Spectography, Report SHSLR 171, Michigan State University (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Tosi].
13. See, e.g., State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971);
State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680, alf'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).
14. See, e.g., People v. Wochnik, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950); People v.
Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
15. See Kaminiski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952).
16. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17. See People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (2d Dist. 1968).
18. See id. at 456-59, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 490-95.
19. See United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972); State ex rel. Trimble
v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
20. See 263 So. 2d at 614.
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For example, in State v. Cary22 voiceprint evidence was held inadmissible to
permit identification. 23 The court variously referred to the test of admissibility

as "general scientific acceptance," 24 "general scientific acceptance of its reliability in the field concerned," 25 and "where a scientific principle or discovery passes from the experimental to the demonstrable stage." 26 Although
it did not delineate the relevant factors it would consider in determining the
admissibility of voiceprint evidence, 27 the court refused admission of voiceprints, since it thought the testimony of one expert witness was not sufficient
28
to establish the technique's scientific acceptability and accuracy.
A different approach was used in People v. King,2 9 which also held identification testimony based on voiceprints inadmissible.3 0 The court not only
found that sound spectography had not attained general acceptance by the
scientific community, 3' but also questioned the admissibility of the opinion
of the state's expert witness. 32 The court found that the witness's expertise
in electrical engineering and physics had not qualified him as an expert in
sound spectography and, therefore, his opinion as an expert was inadmissible. 3 In other words, by exercising its discretion as the general acceptance
test permits,3 4 the court excluded voiceprint evidence based not only upon
the unreliability of the technique, but the lack of relevant expertise of the
35
witness whose opinion was adduced to support the process.
The instant court rejected the holdings of both Cary and King, speculating that they would have been decided differently had those courts had the
advantage of present scientific data.3 6 Instead, the court followed the precedent of several other courts that had admitted voiceprints. 37 In State ex rel.
Trimble v. Hedman3 8 voiceprints were held admissible, but only for the
purpose of corroborating voice identification by aural means. 39 No such
21. Compare State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 684 (1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16,
264 A.2d 209 (1970), with State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d
432 (1971).
22. 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).
23. State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 334, 239 A.2d 680, 685 (1968).
24. Id. at 332, 239 A.2d at 684.
25. Id. at 333, 239 A.2d at 685.
26. Id. at 334, 239 A.2d at 685.
27. See State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264
A.2d 209 (1970).
28. Id. at 333, 239 A.2d at 685.
29. 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968).
30. Id. at 461, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
31. Id. at 456, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
32. Id. at 459, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
33. Id. at 458, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
34. Id. at 443, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
35. Id. at 460, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
36. 263 So. 2d at 614.

37. Id.
38.
39.

291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
Id. at 458, 192 N.W.2d at 441.
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restriction was placed on voiceprint evidence in United States v. Raymond.4 o
Voice prints were admitted for their own evidentiary value and not merely
to corroborate aural identification. Though the test of admissibility in
Raymond was apparently that of "general acceptance," 42 the Trimble court
held voiceprint evidence admissible despite conflicting testimony of the
parties' experts as to the reliability of voiceprint identification. 43
While citing Trimble and Raymond as authority for the admissibility

of voiceprint evidence," the principal court left unanswered the question of
what standard it followed or what factors were determinative of admis-

sibility.- Instead, the court merely pointed out that Florida courts have
broad discretion in the admission of novel or experimental evidence if they
think certain standards of scientific reliability have been attained. 4" The
court found such standards were met.47 The court's use of the term "standards"8 suggests at least two and possibly more requirements must be met

to admit voiceprint evidence. However, the
ticular requisites.4 9
In addition, the majority did not deal
voiceprint evidence raised by the dissent. 50
witness for the state5 had never examined

court did not delineate any parsquarely with the objections to
As the dissent notes, one expert
the tape recordings, which were

alleged to be those of the defendant's voice. 2 Also, the state's second expert

witness did not possess the relevant expertise to qualify him as an expert
in sound spectography. 53
Moreover, the majority did not deal with the possibility of error in
making false identification by voiceprints. Critics contend that the high
40. 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972).
41. Id. at 645.
42. See id. at 643.
43. See State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
44. 263 So. 2d at 614.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court cited Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1968), as its
source for the test of admissibility for scientific proof. In Coppolino, the court purported
to use the general acceptance test. However, that court held that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion in admitting the evidence, even though there was conflicting testimony of the parties' experts as to the reliability of scientific proof. Id. at 71.
48. 263 So. 2d at 614.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 618-19.
51. The prosecution used the testimony of two expert witnesses. One expert qualified
the voiceprint technique as valid and the other testified as to the results of the application
of the technique. The court was thus following the procedure used in State ex rel. Trimble
v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
52. 263 So. 2d at 617 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1972).
53. One expert gave testimony that in his opinion the voice on each tape was that
of the defendant. However, the dissent contended that his testimony was inadmissible,
since he was not trained in phonetics, electronics, or sound spectography and, therefore, he
did not qualify as an expert for purposes of giving opinion testimony on voiceprints. Id.
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degree of reliability shown by studies of voiceprint identifications has been
established, in part, by permitting elimination of those identifications in
which the examiner was unable to make a positive identification5 4 Also,
the number of tests55 made in determining the technique's reliability was
asserted to be too small to accept as proof that no two voices in the world
are alike.56
The reliability of voiceprint identification was questioned for two addi67
tional reasons: voices, unlike fingerprints, are not yet classified by type,
and it has not been established that a person cannot defeat the procedure by
disguising his voice.58 These factors demonstrate that the process is still in
the developmental stage and further studies are required to eliminate deficiencies.59 These defects, contended the dissent, raise serious questions as to
the reliability of the process and reveal it as a potentially dangerous and
unsafe form of proof.60 Nevertheless, the instant decision establishes voiceprint identification as corroborative evidence with no definitive standards of
admission. 61
A more satisfactory test than "general acceptance" is needed for determining admissibility of scientific proof in order to provide standards for the
application of judicial discretion in determining the reliability of such evidence. Initially, the court should ascertain what scientific disciplines are
relevant to an evaluation of the data presented in support of the new device
or technique. 6 2 Next, it should determine which, if any, of the experts available has the necessary expertise and background. 63 Thus, the proponent of the
evidence not only would be required to present experts, but also to show that
the discipline in which their expertise lies is the relevant one. This would
reduce the possibility of courts rejecting the voiceprint technique simply
because of a disagreement among the experts as to its reliability, while also
aiding in the selection of those who are most qualified to give voiceprint
64
identification testimony.

54. Tosi, supra note 12.
55. A total of 34,996 tests were conducted. See id.
56. 263 So. 2d at 617-18.
57. Id. at 617.
58. Since the state's expert admitted more studies are necessary to permit classification
of voices, 263 So. 2d at 618, the dissent is apparently suggesting that this shows a lack of
present knowledge concerning the voiceprint technique and, therefore, it cannot be relied
upon. Id.
59. See 263 So. 2d at 618.
60. Id.
61. In Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96, 98 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972), the court cited the instant
decision as authority for admitting voiceprint evidence as corroboration of the defendant's
identification by other means.
62. The relevant disciplines that were suggested in People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d
437, 456, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 491 (2d Dist. 1968) include electronics, anatomy, medicine,
physiology, phonetics, and linguistics.
63. See id. at 460-61, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
64. See State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968).
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In the instant case voiceprint evidence was employed only for corroboration of evidence already sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. 65
Consequently, it is not dispositive of the question whether voiceprint
evidence, standing alone, would support a conviction.66 Under the "general
acceptance" test, it would be within the court's discretion to ascertain
67
whether voiceprint evidence is reliable enough to be admitted into evidence.
The jury would then have to determine the proper weight to be given to
such evidence.68 However, in order to afford a defendant the assurance that
the jury would not be misled, those experts who do not possess the relevant
expertise should be precluded from testifying. 69
Voiceprint identification promises to be a valuable tool in combating
crime, not only as a deterrent, but also as an aid in prosecution and conviction. It can further serve to exonerate those who find themselves wrongly
charged with criminal violations. Therefore, the technique merits further
study.
Its present use, however, must be closely scrutinized by the courts, since
it is uncertain that no two voices are identical-° and that the process cannot
be defeated by voice disguise. 71 Until further studies of the reliability of
voiceprint identification are made, limiting voiceprint evidence for corroborative purposes seems necessary to insure that the state meets its burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
DAVID PAY MILLER

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

263 So. 2d at 614-15.
Id. The court expressly limited its decision to the facts of the case.
See United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D.D.C. 1972).
Id.
See People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 461, 72 Cal. Rptr., 478, 493 (2d Dist.

1968).
70. See Bolt, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectograms: A Scientist's View of Its
Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. AccoUSTcAL SoC'Y OF Am. 597, 602, 612 (1970). The
author asserts that the number of people tested to date is insignificant to serve as a basis
of proof that voices are unique.
71. 263 So. 2d at 618.
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